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CREATIVE COMMONS, CC-PLUS, AND HYBRID
INTERMEDIARIES: A STAKEHOLDER’S PERSPECTIVE
Guido Russi*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Creative Commons licensing system is a non-profit organization
that was founded to promote free use of creative works. Since its launch
in 2001, this system has inspired a great number of spin-off projects:
Flickr,1 Wikicommons,2 and ccMixter,3 to name but a few. These
projects relate to many different fields, including music, movies,
photographs, scientific articles, and others. While some unique features
characterize each of these spin-offs, all of these new business ventures
initially relied on “traditional” Creative Commons licenses.4
Recently new types of enterprises, such as Beatpick and Jamendo,
have been launched that use Creative Commons licenses in a slightly
different way—they rely on the CC-Plus scheme. The CC-Plus scheme
involves the use of Creative Commons licenses extended to simplify
commercial use of the newly created works.5
It appears that no systematic evaluation of these new business
models has been carried out. Therefore, the purpose of this work is to try
to fill this gap by analyzing these new enterprises to better understand
what drives their success and what their main weaknesses are.
Specifically this study will focus on the digital music market in which
the CC-Plus protocol may be used to develop a solution to the illegal
file-sharing problem, a problem which has caused some of the most
critical litigation in the history of copyright.6
In particular, Parts II and III will introduce the Creative Commons
project and the CC-Plus scheme. Part IV will then present a few relevant
case studies regarding the digital music market. Based on the facts
presented in Part IV, Part V will attempt to give a critical evaluation of
these new business ventures, taking into account the viewpoints of all of
the main stakeholders. Finally, Part VI will discuss some of the issues

* I am much indebted to Frederico Morando and Luigi Russi for their helpful suggestions on
previous drafts of this paper.
1
See Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 45, 56; Who Uses CC?, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/who-uses-cc (last
visited Apr. 28, 2011).
2
See
What
Is
Wikimedia
Commons?,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Welcome (last modified Mar. 5, 2011, 10:00 AM);
Luciano Paccagnella, La gestione della conoscenza nella società dell’informazione: il caso di
Wikipedia [Managing Knowledge in an Information Society: the Wikipedia Case Study], 2007
RASSEGNA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA 653, 659 (It.).
3
See Carroll, supra note 1, at 55.
4
See infra Part II.
5
See infra Part III for a more detailed description.
6
See, e.g., MGM Inc v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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that seem to be limiting the actual development and implementation of
CC-Plus systems.
II. WHAT IS CREATIVE COMMONS?
Creative Commons is a non-profit organization that was founded in
2001 with the primary purpose of facilitating free use—including re-use
and modification—of creative works.7 To do so, a set of licenses is
issued at no charge to the public, empowering the author of a creative
work to “keep … copyright while allowing certain uses”8 of his creation.
In other words, Creative Commons enables protection of creative works
under a “some rights reserved” copyright instead of the default “all rights
reserved” copyright that automatically accrues on a work under the
current intellectual property regime. Under this new system, individuals
who are interested in uses of the work that have been explicitly permitted
by the author are no longer required to separately secure an individual
license. As a result, they encounter lower transaction costs in the process
of using and reusing the works of others.9 This system is meant to
increase “the body of work that is available to the public for free and
legal sharing, use, repurposing, and remixing.”10
In particular, Creative Commons licenses are characterized by
“modular contractual terms.”11 These terms can be arranged together to
create six different types of licenses,12 each one allowing different
royalty-free uses of the work. The six available options13 are (1)
Attribution, (2) Attribution Share Alike, (3) Attribution No Derivatives,
(3) Attribution Non-Commercial, (4) Attribution Non-Commercial Share
Alike, and (5) Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives.14 These
licenses are made up of three parts:
7
See Description of Creative Commons’ Vision and Mission, CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Apr. 28, 2011); Niva Elkin-Koren, Exploring Creative
Commons: A Skeptical View of a Worthy Pursuit, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 325, 325 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt
Hugenholtz eds., Kluwer Law International 2006).
8
CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 7.
9
Elkin-Koren, supra note 7, at 325.
10
What
is
Creative
Commons?,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/images/3/35/Creativecommons-what-is-creative-commons_eng.pdf
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
11
Elkin-Koren, supra note 7, at 330.
12
For a list of the licenses, see About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
13
For a detailed description of each of these licenses, see id.
14
Additional licenses may be tailored to suit the needs of particular communities (for example,
the sampling licenses for musicians). See Carroll, supra note 1, at 47.
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1. human-readable language (the Commons Deed), which sets out
the key aspects of the license in a language that is universally
intelligible;
2. lawyer-readable language (the Legal Code), which has been
drafted by a network of lawyers from all of the fifty-two
jurisdictions where Creative Commons has so far spread; and
3. machine-readable language (the Digital Code or metadata),
which enables search engines to identify the licensed work.15
The choices of these contractual terms give the owners greater
flexibility as they make their work available to the public. In addition to
the greater flexibility provided by Creative Commons, one of the slogans
under which Creative Commons is currently being promoted is “Skip the
Intermediaries.”16 As stated by Michael Carroll, one of the co-founders
of Creative Commons, “Creative Commons licenses act as a
disintermediating force because they enable end-to-end transactions in
copyrighted works.”17 To better evaluate this benefit, it is helpful to
separate the two potential classes of creative works uses into noncommercial and commercial uses.
Non-commercial use of a work seems to be greatly simplified by the
Creative Commons system. Since none of the six available licenses
requires potential users to separately secure an individual license for noncommercial activities, persons interested in such activities are not
involved in negotiations and, therefore, no longer need the assistance of
intermediaries. Hence, looking at non-commercial activities, the Creative
Commons project seems to be successfully cutting intermediaries out of
the market by lowering transaction costs for all types of operations.
On the other hand, the situation becomes more complicated with
commercial use of creative works. Depending on the license chosen,
commercial uses are regulated in different ways under the Creative
Commons regime. While three of the six licenses permit free commercial
exploitation of a work,18 the remaining three contain a Non-Commercial
clause, which requires individuals to secure a separate license if the work
is to be used for commercial purposes. While the former situation does
not seem to pose significant problems to potential licensees, the latter
may be slightly problematic. With Non-Commercial licenses, a direct
15
See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Frequently_Asked_Questions (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
16
Get Creative!, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/videos/get-creative (last
visited Apr. 28, 2011).
17
Carroll, supra note 1, at 47.
18
These are the Attribution, Attribution Share Alike, and Attribution Share Alike No
Derivatives licenses.
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bargaining between the author of the work and the potential licensees is
required, even though such a bargaining process might not always be a
viable option.
This problem is especially clear in the case of an extremely valuable
work with a strong market demand. In this case, the number of would-be
licensees might be very large. If the author of such a work licenses his
creation under the Creative Commons regime using a Non-Commercial
clause, he will be required to carry out a negotiation with each one of the
aspiring licensees, facing all the associated transaction costs. This might
decrease the financial reward for the author with respect to the traditional
combination of ordinary copyright and reliance on collecting societies.
As a result, the two primary functions of copyright—rewarding the
investment of the author and incentivizing dissemination of the work19—
might be frustrated. That is where the CC-Plus scheme comes in.
III. WHAT IS CC-PLUS AND HOW DOES IT WORK?
As discussed above,20 when an individual author chooses one of the
Creative Commons licenses containing the Non-Commercial clause,
transaction costs associated with the negotiation of commercial licenses
may increase. In this context, Michael Carroll’s assertion that
“intermediaries are necessary to all kinds of transactions in commerce,
culture, and news”21 seems to be confirmed. New kinds of intermediating
bodies that give assistance to the author in the process of negotiating
commercial licenses might actually be a way to limit the increase in
transaction costs. In his article, Creative Commons and the New
Intermediaries, Carroll describes this process of re-intermediation.22
Search engines, archives, libraries, producers, and publishers are some of
the examples given by Carroll of entities that have started acting as
intermediaries in the management of works licensed under the new
Creative Commons regime. Since the publication of Carroll’s article in
2006, however, the re-intermediating process has not stopped and one of
the main reasons for this is the introduction of the CC-Plus scheme.

19
See Maria Lillà Montagnani & Maurizio Borghi, Positive Copyright and Open Content
Licenses: How to Make a Marriage Work by Empowering Authors to Disseminate Their Creations,
12 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 244, 248–49 (2008).
20
See supra Part II.
21
Carroll, supra note 1, at 45.
22
Id.
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CC-Plus is a beta23 protocol launched in 2007 to provide the
intermediaries mentioned above with a legal infrastructure that they may
operate within.24 Traditional Creative Commons licenses enable authors
to retain copyright over their works, while granting specific types of free
uses. What happens however, if a user wants to acquire rights that extend
beyond those granted by Creative Commons licenses? An example is the
commercial use of a creation licensed with a Non-Commercial Creative
Commons license. The CC-Plus protocol empowers the author to license
his work with Creative Commons and at the same time specify, for
example, a broker that would handle rights that go beyond the scope of a
Creative Commons license.25 Technically, this is done by adding a “more
permissions” link to the traditional Creative Commons icons that usually
accompany a work, which leads to the site of a broker. The broker offers
an infrastructure to channel the demand for rights of commercial
exploitation over the author’s creation, so as to increase standardization
and to lower transaction costs.26 This way, the author manages to offer
his work to the public free of charge for non-commercial use, but at the
same time he is provided with an easy way to issue commercial licenses
to those interested in the work for commercial uses.27 The architecture of
the CC-Plus scheme enables a commercial economy to co-exist with, or
be grafted onto, the sharing economy created by the Creative Commons
system.28
The potential applications for this protocol are countless. In fact, the
model has already been adopted by several companies operating in
different domains such as Blip.tv in the field of video sharing, or Pump
Audio in the field of musical compositions.29
IV. A FEW CASE STUDIES FROM THE DIGITAL MUSIC MARKET
Since the release of the CC-Plus protocol in 2007, many new
ventures have tried to build business models that offer this licensing
23
In this article, the term beta is used to describe a protocol that is undergoing a test phase. A
beta version of software is described as “the first working version distributed to external customers.”
Alan MacCormack, Product-Development Practices that Work: How Internet Companies Build
Software, 42 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 75, 79 (2001).
24
See CC and CC+ Overview for the World Wide Web, CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/images/3/37/Creativecommons-ccplus-overview-for-the-worldwide-web_eng.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter CC and CC+ Overview].
25
Id.
26
See Press Release, Creative Commons, Creative Commons Launches CC0 and CC+
Programs (Dec. 17, 2007), http://creativecommons.org/press-releases/entry/7919.
27
Id.
28
See CC and CC+ Overview, supra note 24.
29
See Press Release, Creative Commons, supra note 26.
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scheme. Looking at the domain of music, several different websites have
been launched in an attempt to successfully adopt the protocol.
A few case studies are reported below as further evidence of how the
CC-Plus protocol has been implemented in practice. The business
ventures listed below are just some of the projects that have been
launched. They have been preferred over their competitors30 in this work
because more information and data is currently available for them,
perhaps because of the greater visibility acquired by these websites.
Moreover, the three Internet sites hereafter analyzed present most of the
key features of these developing business models. Thus, they also
provide a good summary of the core structure of open music licensing
systems. The following analysis casts some light upon the possible future
evolution of the digital music market.
A. Beatpick.com
Launched in February 2006,31 Beatpick.com is an Internet site whose
core business is music licensing.32 Since its inception, Beatpick has
undergone considerable development. The available data attests to this
progress. Besides opening international offices in the United Kingdom
and Italy, Beatpick has provided licenses for over 3,000 music tracks
produced by 120 artists,33 and has partnered with important brands such
as Mercedes Benz, Ralph Lauren, and 20th Century Fox.34 It has even
launched a spin-off project, called SoundReef.35
To better understand the determinants of this intensive growth, it is
useful to examine its key features carefully and break down the website’s
structure to point out its key functioning principles.
1) How Users Benefit

30
Other
websites
include
Youlicense,
www.youlicense.com;
Pumpaudio,
www.pumpaudio.com; and Opsound, www.opsound.org. See id.; Michael W. Carroll, Creative
Commons as Conversational Copyright, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 445, 454 (Peter K. Yu ed., Greenwood
Publishing Group 2007).
31
Does the World Still Need a Beatpick?, BEATPICK (Oct. 7, 2008),
http://blog.beatpick.com/does-the-world-still-need-a-beatpick/.
32
Beatpick Study, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Beatpick_study (last
modified Sept. 3, 2010, 8:22 PM) [hereinafter Beatpick Study].
33
The data refers to October, 2007. See id.
34
FAQ, BEATPICK, http://www.beatpick.com/intro/faq (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter
FAQ].
35
See BeatPick.com presents… SoundReef!!!, BEATPICK (Nov. 14, 2008),
http://blog.beatpick.com/2008/11/.
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Beatpick has built its end-user appeal on a few important aspects.
First of all, even though the website supports a very wide variety of
artists and genres, a thorough quality control is carried out over music
tracks. Beatpick generally accepts only 10% of over two hundred
submissions per month.36
Besides quality and diversity, another important aspect of Beatpick is
its pricing policy. While the website does not charge for non-commercial
uses, rights for commercial use can be secured at prices that are up to
70% lower37 than those offered by collecting societies for licenses
encompassing the same uses.
Finally, like all works licensed with Creative Commons, Beatpick’s
music compositions are distributed with no technological measures of
protection. The absence of digital rights management (DRM) protective
measures, together with other services offered by the site, such as the
possibility to preview all works and the option to re-download tracks
after the initial purchase, facilitate quick and easy access to the database
of songs.
In summary, Beatpick’s four main selling points are quality,
diversity, pricing, and quick and easy access to the database.
2) How Artists Benefit
As outlined by Beatpick’s CEO David d’Atri, “artists are in different
segments of the market depending on the status of their careers.”38
Beatpick tries to address their specific needs and goals by providing
them with “an extra tool”39 to earn money and to gain exposure.40 This is
achieved by offering artists non-exclusive agreements, which can be
terminated anytime with a thirty-day notice. Beatpick uses Creative
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share Alike licenses by default.
According to d’Atri, these serve as the “perfect legal framework for the
label”41 because they balance “the need to make a living with the need
for advertisement.”42 These licenses are characterized by a flexibility that

36

See FAQ, supra note 34.
For example, webradios to be broadcasted in public or private spaces. See Beatpick Study,
supra note 32.
38
David d’Atri, CEO, Beatpick.com – SoundReef.com, Powerpoint Presentation at Bocconi
University: Intellectual Property—Legal Management of IPRs (Nov. 11, 2008),
http://www.antitrustisti.net/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_view/gid,912/Itemid,32/.
39
FAQ, supra note 34.
40
See id.
41
Beatpick Study, supra note 32.
42
Id. With the expressions “need to make a living” and “need for advertisement,” d’Atri seems
to be referring to the situation of those artists that choose to sacrifice their short-term gains to
37
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could be appealing not only to amateur musicians, but perhaps even to
professional artists.
In addition, artists profit from contributing to the website in many
different ways: earnings from a track distributed through Beatpick are
split evenly between the site and the artist, backend royalties belong
entirely to the musician, and artists gain free advertising from
participating in the project.43
3) Philosophy
Naturally Beatpick shares the vision that lies behind the Creative
Commons project. Indeed, they give support to “people who remix,
podcast, or create multimedia projects with [their] music and disseminate
it on the web.”44
An important reason for participating in the Creative Commons
project is that Beatpick understands that “non-commercial uses simply
would not happen[—]or worse[,] would happen illegally[—]in today’s
music market.”45 Hence, its developers prefer to “encourage correct
name association/credits and adapt to these situations, which may well
turn into commercial opportunities in the future.”46 Thus, Beatpick’s
implementation of the CC-Plus protocol might also be due to a belief that
Creative Commons could actually be a valid response to illegal file
sharing.
However, in implementing the Creative Commons system, Beatpick
follows a rather prudent line. The website still exercises some control
over free downloading of tracks for allegedly non-commercial uses. In
such circumstances, users are required to provide Beatpick with their
name, email address, and a description of the intended use of the song.
Moreover, in browsing Beatpick’s website, it appears that the download
of certain tracks for specific non-commercial uses, like Listening
Pleasure, are not permitted at all even upon payment. Therefore, it looks
like Beatpick has taken several different precautionary measures to
prevent abuse of the Creative Commons licensing scheme.
B. Jamendo.com

acquire greater visibility and, yet, need to offset these short-term losses with subsequent forms of
remuneration.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
FAQ, supra note 34.
46
Id.
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The second business venture that deserves a more detailed analysis is
Jamendo. This music platform—founded in Luxembourg in May 2004—
offers the largest catalog of tracks licensed with Creative Commons.47 At
the time of this writing, Jamendo has published over 40,000 albums and
has over 600,000 active members.48 The website’s persistent
development is also attested by the fact that Jamendo’s customers
include names such as Ducati and Skoda.49 In July 2007, this business
venture was even targeted by Mangrovia Capital Partners, a
Luxembourg-based venture capital company that decided to invest in this
project.50 The reasons behind Jamendo’s prosperity are numerous, and an
analysis of its key features is useful in trying to single them out. Even
though Jamendo’s model presents many similarities to Beatpick’s,
several important differences exist between the two websites that should
be noted.
1) How Users Benefit
From a user’s point of view, Jamendo offers free, simple, and quick
access to a very large database of musical compositions, which may
either be downloaded through a peer-to-peer system or be accessed via
streaming.51 For such purposes, users are not required to register with the
website, even though they do have an option to do so. Furthermore, just
like Beatpick’s tracks, files downloaded from Jamendo are not protected
with DRM technologies.52
One unique feature of Jamendo which deserves emphasis is its
community rating system.53 To grant a quality service to users, Jamendo
provides them with a set of tools to distribute, catalog, and rate music.54
These tools facilitate the selection of tracks by website visitors.
2) How Artists Benefit
47
See FAQ, JAMENDO, http://www.jamendo.com/en/faq (last visited Apr. 28, 2011)
[hereinafter Jamendo FAQ].
48
See JAMENDO, http://www.jamendo.com/en/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
49
See Jamendo PRO FAQ, JAMENDO, http://pro.jamendo.com/en/faq/41 (last visited Apr. 28,
2011).
50
See CREATIVE COMMONS CLINIC ET AL., BUILDING AN AUSTRALASIAN COMMONS:
CREATIVE COMMONS CASE STUDIES, VOLUME 1, at 24 (Rachel Cobcroft ed., Creative Commons
Clinic, Austl. Research Council Ctr. of Excellence for Creative Indus. & Innovation 2008), available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/35020016/Building-an-Australasian-Commons-Case-StudiesVolume-1.
51
See Choose Streaming and Downloading Options, JAMENDO (Feb. 21, 2008),
http://blog.jamendo.com/2008/02/21/choose-streaming-and-download-options/.
52
See CREATIVE COMMONS CLINIC ET AL., supra note 50, at 25.
53
See id. at 23.
54
See id. at 25.
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Unlike Beatpick, Jamendo does not have a default license. Artists
have the opportunity to choose any of the existing Creative Commons
licenses, and they may even resort to Free Art licensing, “a French
copyleft [license] applying to works of art.”55 The reasons for employing
Creative Commons licenses, according to Chief Technology Officer
Sylvain Zimmer, are the flexibility offered to the artists, the clarity of the
Commons Deed and the quality of the Legal Code and the Digital Code,
and the unceasing expansion of the community supporting Creative
Commons.56
For these reasons Creative Commons licenses constitute Jamendo’s
legal framework, which represents a useful tool for musicians to publish
their works in the way that most suits their needs. This is an aspect of the
website that should be very appealing to artists.
In addition, there are several features that have been designed to
attract musicians to the website. In particular, Jamendo emphasizes three
aspects of its Internet site:57
1. It is a non-exclusive platform. While contributing to Jamendo’s
database, artists have the option to enter agreements with other
licensing companies, even involving the same tracks.
2. It is a zero-cost platform. Thanks to its peer-to-peer distributing
system, Jamendo manages to keep the costs of hosting files
rather low. This enables the website to offer free hosting services
to musicians and, at the same time, limits the volume of
advertisement required to fund the site, keeping it at a minimal
level.
3. It is a free platform. Artists are free to terminate their agreement
at any time, and remove their music from Jamendo.com. This
leaves the artist free, for example, to sign an exclusive contract
with other recording companies.
However, it is important to point out that use of this hosting service
is not always possible for artists registered with certain collective rights
societies, such as the Italian Società Italiana degli Autori ed Editori
(SIAE), whose contracts might be exclusive and might therefore prevent
artists from making their music available for free on the Internet.58
55
Case
Studies:
Jamendo,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Case_Studies/Jamendo_Study (last modified Dec. 16, 2010, 7:49
PM).
56
See CREATIVE COMMONS CLINIC ET AL., supra note 50, at 26.
57
See id. at 23.
58
See Jamendo FAQ, supra note 47; infra Part V.E. It is important to specify that such an
incompatibility between the mandates of some collecting societies and individual licensing choices
of authors is not specific to Jamendo, but applies, in general, to Creative Commons and similar
licensing schemes.
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Artists have economic incentives to contribute to Jamendo’s
database besides the simplicity and versatility of the website and the
potential visibility that may be acquired by participating in the project.
For instance, the website grants three forms of financial reward for
artists59 (see also picture 1 below):

Picture 1. Jamendo.com: sources of revenue for the artist.

1. Donations: members of Jamendo.com are encouraged to support
their favorite artists by making donations. The minimum
donation allowed is five dollars and Jamendo retains an
administrative fee on each donation. The fee is set to a level that
allows artists to earn at least 90% of the original donation.
2. Advertisements: Jamendo shares 50% of the revenue generated
through advertising with its contributors, according to each
user’s statistics such as page views.
3. Commercial uses: artists have the option to enter the commercial
programs set up by the music platform. In this situation, a
minimum of 50% of the associated licenses fees are paid to the
artist.

59
See Michael Jonathan Todosichuk, Understanding Musical Artists’ Motivation to Share
Creative Commons Licensed Musical Works: Applying Social Capital and Social Cognitive Theory
(June 2009) (unpublished master’s thesis, National Cheng Kung University), available at
http://etdncku.lib.ncku.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/getfile?URN=etd-0719109173414&filename=etd-0719109-173414.pdf; Jamendo FAQ, supra note 47.
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Even though each of these three channels is designed to remunerate
artists, it is important to point out the fact that, in practice, donations tend
to be a minor stream of income for musicians.60
3) Other features
One of the website’s main strengths is the community that has
formed around it through the interaction between artists and users. For
example, artists can create their own profile on Jamendo.com where they
can post photos or announce events. In turn, users submit reviews, create
playlists, signal their favorite works to the community, and much more.61
These activities play a key role in Jamendo’s business model.
Users’ activities also contribute to building up a valuable database of
information about visitors’ preferences and artists’ performances on the
website. Their comments and discussions help assess the value of a
work, at least as perceived by the website’s visitors. The statistics
gathered based on their feedback are made available to the public and
represent a valuable asset for the site’s future development. By
interacting with each other, users start understanding that they are part of
a collaboration space and regard themselves as part of a community. This
message could be critical in supporting sharing activities like those
promoted by Jamendo.
4) Philosophy
This music platform has been designed to encourage the circulation
of creative works, foster exchange, and promote creativity.62 Jamendo’s
founder and CEO Laurent Kratz described the website’s activity as
“economically supporting and promoting the long tail of music.”63 This
is accomplished by promoting diversity in the music industry. This
vision matches the Creative Commons objectives. Furthermore, the
website’s considerable development provides empirical evidence that the
Creative Commons system may be a viable alternative to the traditional
60

See CREATIVE COMMONS CLINIC ET AL., supra note 50, at 24.
See Case Studies: Jamendo, supra note 55.
62
See FAQ: How it Works, JAMENDO, http://www.jamendo.com/en/faq (last visited Apr. 28,
2011).
63
See Case Studies: Jamendo, supra note 55. The term long tail of music refers to a business
theory developed by Chris Anderson. According to this theory, “in an era without the constraints of
physical shelf space and other bottlenecks of distribution, narrowly targeted goods and services can
be as economically attractive as mainstream fare.” CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE
FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE 52 (Hyperion ed. 2008).
61
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copyright system or a form of sustainable evolution of the traditional
system.
C. Magnatune.com
Magnatune is the final example of a music platform adopting the
CC-Plus scheme. It is the oldest venture of those discussed. Founded in
2003 by John Buckman, Magnatune.com is an online record label that
“has been a leader in the implementation of the CC-Plus protocol.”64
Like its competitors, Magnatune has managed to acquire great visibility
and build a valuable open-music database. Magnatune currently has 328
artists that have used Magnatune’s platform for the distribution of 10,079
songs.65
1) How users benefit
Magnatune’s first selling point is diversity. The website is meant to
be a platform for “music that gets little radio airplay or major record
distribution, but has a fairly large audience.”66 In fact, the Internet site
hosts tracks from many different genres—from “Electronica” to “New
Age” music.
What distinguishes Magnatune from other music platforms, however,
is the pricing model used. Fares on Magnatune vary depending on
multiple factors. For commercial uses, Magnatune acts as a broker in
setting the prices for such licenses. On the other hand, dealing with noncommercial licenses is slightly more complicated. In this case, users have
two options: they may choose a free download of a 128k mp3 file that
contains advertising, or they may purchase a higher quality download or
a physical CD, both advertisement free.
In the latter situation, the buyer decides how much to spend on the
album.67 Payments range from $5 to $18, but the suggested price for a
purchase is $8. Surprisingly, a recent study showed that users pay an
average of $8.20 per album—a price that is higher than both the
minimum price and the suggested price.68
64

CREATIVE COMMONS CLINIC ET AL., supra note 50, at 29.
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This variable pricing system also plays an important role in orienting
consumers. By choosing what amount of money to spend, customers
unveil their willingness to pay and, as a result, statistics on the bestselling albums are available on the website and act as signals for
potential buyers to assist them in their purchases.
In addition, Magnatune’s developers have designed other
mechanisms to ensure quality of service: a peer editorial approval
process carried out by artists already on the label,69 and a quality
assessment performed by the website’s administrators. This selection is
meant to “[give] credibility to musicians who are accepted”70 and
guarantees a predefined quality standard for the works distributed
through the music platform.
Another mechanism used is a service of free “webradios” that plays a
significant role in guiding the audience in its buying process. Unlike
Jamendo, Magnatune does not rely heavily on a community rating
system, even though the site does host discussion forums. Finally,
another feature that might be appealing to Magnatune’s users is that
downloaded files have no DRM protections attached to them and there is
no review of the use of licensed music.71
2) How artists benefit
Magnatune describes one of the big concepts behind its experiment
by saying “[t]he systematic destruction of musician[s’] lives is
unacceptable.”72 One of Magnatune’s purposes is to “help artists get
exposure, make at least as much money they would make with traditional
labels, and help them get fans and concerts.”73
In particular, artists collaborating with Magnatune have three main
sources of income: 50% of the price of each album, 50% of the revenue
derived from any commercial sub-licensing, and 50% of the
merchandising revenues.74 These channels should represent a form of
“incremental income”75 for contributors.
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See The Plan: Problems With the Music Industry and How Magnatune Is Trying to Fix
Them, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/plan (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
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visited Apr. 28, 2011).
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The music platform offers its artists the opportunity to license their
works under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share
Alike license and to sign a non-exclusive agreement with Magnatune
with a standard duration of five years.76 As Magnatune itself
acknowledges, this “[n]onexclusive relationship with musicians means
lower Magnatune investment in artists, more investment in promoting
itself and the entire catalog.”77 The website actually invests money in
advertising78 and all tracks distributed for free for non-commercial uses
contain advertisements for the website. Through its actions,
Magnatune.com manages to make non-exclusive agreements79
convenient both for its artists and for the netlabel itself.
D. Summary
For ease of comparison, the chart in the Appendix summarizes the
main features of the three websites’ business models.
V. A STAKEHOLDER’S PERSPECTIVE
Having presented these three business ventures it is critical to
evaluate their structures based on the viewpoints of the main
stakeholders: artists, users, recording companies, the legal system,
collection societies, and society as a whole.
A. Artists
It is difficult to accurately evaluate artists’ motivations for turning to
these new intermediaries for aid in the commercial exploitation of their
creations. As Beatpick’s CEO David d’Atri observed,80 the artist
category is very broad and includes different classes of musicians, each
with different needs and goals. Nevertheless, it is important to assess
their perspective, taking into account the diverse composition of this
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category of stakeholders. Using d’Atri’s typology, musicians can be
classified into five categories:81
1. “Quality professionals”—these are famous artists with
substantial bargaining power in their negotiations with
customers. Exhibition sales for these artists are strong.
2. “Professionals”—these are non-famous artists with limited
bargaining power in their negotiations with customers. These
musicians are still capable of making a living out of their careers.
3. “Developing professionals”—these are non-famous artists with
very weak bargaining power in their negotiations with
customers. Exhibition sales for these artists are not strong
enough to enable them to live off their artistic career. The main
concern for these artists is that of acquiring visibility.
4. “Students”—these are artists who still need to complete a
specific learning process to become professionals. These nonfamous artists do not have any bargaining power in their
negotiations with customers and do not make a living out of their
artistic activity.
5. “Amateurs”—these are artists who compose and perform music
just as a hobby or as a passion.
Of these groups, quality professionals in particular are a very critical
category for the ultimate success of these new business models. Famous
musicians might be the market players that are less willing to change the
current situation, which presently favors them. This is due to music being
an informational good.82 Because of this feature of music, a
“superstardom effect” characterizes the music market. Consumers tend to
minimize their search and sampling costs by listening primarily to works
of artists with a well-established reputation.83 The Creative Commons
system and the CC-Plus protocol would lower search and sampling costs
and might therefore undermine the superstardom effect.
On the other hand, studies have shown that this sampling might also
have a positive effect for artists. Because music is an informational good,
and because sampling enables consumers to make a more informed
purchase decision, consumers might be more willing to pay more for the
tracks they desire if they can sample the tracks before they purchase
them.84 Therefore, if sufficient incentives to purchase a paid version of
81
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the song were created,85 it would be possible to leverage a financial
return out of sharing and sampling activities. This is exactly what
Magnatune does—it offers lower quality versions of the songs for free
for non-commercial use, thereby providing a means for sampling. Then,
it proposes higher quality versions, which are sold using a variable
pricing system.
Thus, the introduction of the CC-Plus protocol may have two
opposite effects on famous artists’ revenues: the erosion of the
“superstardom effect,” which leads to lower revenues, and the increased
“willingness-to-pay” effect, which can be leveraged to increase revenues.
Depending on the relative strength of the two contrasting effects, the
publication of works using the CC-Plus protocol may or may not be
advantageous for well-known artists. Predicting which one of the two
effects will be dominant is difficult because the outcome depends on the
specific artist and the specific features of the music platform chosen.
A curious experiment carried out by the famous band Radiohead is
an example of a real-life situation in which making an album available to
the public for sharing purposes actually turned out to be a profitable
initiative for a well-known group of musicians. In 2007, Radiohead
decided to make their album In Rainbows available for download directly
from their own website, giving their fans an option to pay whatever
amount of money they wanted for it, including nothing.86 This
downloading option remained available for exactly two months.87 The
initiative facilitated sharing and sampling of the album by consumers
and, surprisingly enough, overall revenues from the campaign exceeded
revenues from previous albums.88 Even though no Creative Commons
license was used by the band, this experiment constitutes a valid example
of artists sharing their works with the public and leveraging value in a
way that empowers them and actually increases their income.
For the lesser-known categories of artists—“professionals,”
“developing professionals,” “students,” and “amateurs”—the analysis
becomes much more straightforward. From their viewpoint, the erosion
of the “superstardom effect” does not have a negative effect on their
revenues. In fact, by lowering searching and sampling costs, Creative
85
See Sudip Bhattacharjee et al., Whatever Happened to Payola? An Empirical Analysis of
Online Music Sharing, 42 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 104, 118 (2006).
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Commons and the CC-Plus protocol will only benefit unknown artists by
helping them become known by potential consumers.
Furthermore, CC-Plus intermediaries may be a way for unknown
artists to gain exposure and promote live events, which constitute a main
source of income for non-bestselling artists.89 Hence, implementation of
the CC-Plus protocol does not seem to threaten obscure artists’ revenues.
Indeed, lesser-known artists may be the market players benefiting the
most from these new business models.
So far only artists’ financial or economic motivations in licensing
their works under a Creative Commons license have been discussed.
However, they may also have non-economic motivations for creating
new works. For example, a 2006 study suggests that “[i]nnovation in the
creative commons is driven by a set of motives (desire for excellence,
self-expression, altruism and sheer enjoyment) that may be broadly
classed as creative rather than monetary or organizational.”90 These
creative motives may well encourage artists—both famous and
obscure—to share their works for non-monetary reasons.
To explain artist’s motivations for sharing their works, Michael
Todosichuk has applied social cognitive theory to explain artists’
motivation to share. He found that four factors appear to be “positively
associated with the Quantity of Creative Works Shared.”91 These are (1)
“Identification with the Creative Commons virtual community,”92 (2)
“Shared Vision”93 within the community, (3) “Positive Personal
Outcome Expectations”94 within the community, and (4) “Positive
Community-related Outcome Expectations” within the community.95
According to Todosichuk, to motivate artists it is important to act on
these four levels. To do so it is crucial to build a thriving community
behind the music platform. Jamendo is a good practical example of an
Internet site with such community support.
Business models implementing the CC-Plus protocol may, from a
monetary perspective, primarily be attractive to non-famous artists. They
may also become interesting to well-known artists if such business
ventures adequately manage to leverage value out of these new channels
89
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of distribution. Moreover, non-monetary factors may also be valuable
tools in motivating both famous and non-famous artists to contribute to
these new hybrid economies.
One article suggests that the market for music items might display
network externalities, such as fan clubs sharing information.96 Taking
this idea into account, the CC-Plus scheme can also be thought of as a
means for authors to facilitate the initial diffusion of their creations. This
initial diffusion is a critical phase of the commercialization process in
industries that exhibit network externalities.97
B. Users
All of these business ventures offer several benefits for users and
visitors of the music platforms. First, the websites provide their visitors
with free access to their content for non-commercial purposes. Even
Beatpick, whose developers appear to be controlling access to the tracks
to prevent abuse of the Creative Commons licenses,98 allows free,
specifically non-commercial uses of its database.
Second, with these new intermediaries being launched, commercial
use of creative works is substantially simplified as well. Besides offering
lower fares for music licensing, these Internet sites standardize the
negotiation process for acquiring rights to a work. As Creative Commons
founder Lawrence Lessig pointed out, “costs of negotiating and clearing
the rights”99 are currently noteworthy.100 Purchasing music through these
new intermediating entities might be a viable way to reduce such costs.
Aside from offering simple and quick access to creative works, these
new business ventures are characterized by another important strength:
they distribute works which would otherwise be unavailable to the public
and, consequently, they offer customers a great variety of content.
Consumers benefit from having a wider choice, as they will be more
likely to encounter tracks that cater to their musical tastes.
96
See Ram D. Gopal et al., Do Artists Benefit from Online Music Sharing?, 79 J. BUS. 1503,
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Third, another advantage to the implementation of this new protocol
is that it enables users to carry out sharing and sampling activities
without violating the law and risking criminal conviction. This is a great
incentive to use these new music platforms.
This form of licensing also increases possibilities for users to remix
and repurpose creative works in a completely legal way as long as the
terms of the Creative Commons license are respected. Easing remixing
activities may help a new form of culture development, advocated by
Lessig, called the “Read/Write culture.”101 It is a system in which users
not only develop their knowledge through exposure to the existing
culture, but also contribute to the bulk of works with their remixing
activities.
The final advantage to users is that due to the absence of DRM
protections on the distributed files, these ventures give greater
opportunities for users to time- and space-shift the purchased material.
This is an important point. As Lessig points out, “[t]he expectation of
access on demand builds slowly”102 and “at a certain point, perfect access
(meaning the ability to get whatever you want whenever you want it) will
seem obvious.”103 Thus, in the future, restrictions on the use of purchased
songs might be perceived as unreasonable and might consequently lead
to a drop in sales for the enterprises still applying such constraints. With
this in mind, music platforms that do not use these technologies or
restrictions, such as Beatpick, Jamendo or Magnatune, appear to better
suit the needs of users.104
The paragraphs above describe just some of the many potential user
benefits. However, since these new business ventures operate in a hybrid
economy which, to succeed, requires all of its players to benefit on
balance,105 it might be important to find out whether users not only
benefit, but contribute in some way to this sharing economy.
To emphasize this critical feature of these new business ventures, the
role of consumers must be examined. In using the music platforms,
consumers do not only gain simple, and mostly free, access to musical
content but also, as a by-product of their sampling activities, they must
provide the website and the music market with important information
about their listening habits. Since music is an informational good, music
platforms and recording companies may use this consumer information
101
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to better evaluate the true quality and expected sales of the tracks that
they are planning to distribute. Just like their predecessors, Jamendo,
Magnatune, and Beatpick may take advantage of the activities of their
users. “Simply by listening to music, members generate value for the
community.”106
While consumers may benefit in many different ways from the use of
the newly launched music platforms they would not be taking unfair
advantage of the artists’ contributions because their activities provide
these sharing economies with valuable information in return.
C. Recording Companies
As mentioned above, the Creative Commons project is campaigned
as a way to “skip the intermediaries.”107 Yet, the implementation of the
CC-Plus protocol might indicate that intermediating bodies are actually
necessary in the music market.108 Several articles emphasize the need for
entities that would help consumers filter the incredible amount of
musical works available on the market.109 In this re-intermediating
process, however, it appears that recording companies might be replaced
by a group of new online music platforms, including sites using the CCPlus protocol. One commentator in particular suggest that “new online
distribution technologies . . . are likely to decrease the role of labels,”110
taking up some of the functions that have been carried out by labels in
the past.
However, the development of new business models does not have to
be seen as a replacement of recording companies. Instead, these new
ventures may be seen as a potential source of inspiration for traditional
record labels, encouraging them to improve their own structure.
According to one report, the music industry had a decline in the sales of
physical formats and an increase in digital sales in 2009.111 This report
also noted that the increase in the weight of digital sales is not a new
phenomenon, but rather constitutes an established trend.112 This trend
started eight years ago in the United States. If the music industry keeps
106
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evolving in the same fashion in the coming years, the CC-Plus protocol
might represent an interesting opportunity for recording companies to
adapt to the changing environment.
Surprisingly, creating business ventures that enable legal digital
download of music files might actually turn out to be a profitable
strategy for major labels. Indeed, there are many reasons why the hybrid
intermediaries analyzed in the previous paragraphs may actually generate
net financial gains for recording companies.
First, by promoting lesser-known artists, these Internet sites offer
great diversity. Using the “long tail principle,” Chris Anderson explained
that in a market characterized by low inventory costs, such as the digital
music market, offering variety may be an important factor in trying to
outperform competitors.113
Second, the music industry has traditionally been characterized by a
phenomenon where only a few albums turn out to be profitable out of all
the albums released by a recording company. These new systems might
actually help generate more profits for recording companies. According
to a study published by the Los Angeles Times, only one act out of ten
manages to generate profits.114 An extensive part of these profits goes to
compensating losses derived from the release of the remaining
unprofitable albums. Recording companies might decrease these losses
in the new distributing systems, where information about users’
preferences is available. Recording companies might find it easier to
effectively predict which albums are going to be successful, and thus be
able to concentrate their investments on those acts that are most likely to
succeed. This could lead to a less risky and more profitable business for
the recording companies.115
Even though free and legal downloading systems are likely to cause
a further decrease in the sales of recorded music, it is important to note
that there are many ways in which financial return may be leveraged out
of these new sharing economies; for example, by adding incentives to
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pay for enhanced versions of the downloaded files. These solutions have
been described above.116
In spite of all of these advantages to the recording companies, it
would be unrealistic to say that they should be able to reach the same
level of profits they had when online music sharing did not yet exist.
With the launch of these new music platforms, the music market, which
has historically been monopolized by only five major recording
companies,117 would open up to a much larger number of intermediaries.
The relinquishment of this oligopoly would probably lead to lower
profits for the major labels controlling the market. Despite this, by
integrating their own business models into this new protocol, recording
companies might still be able to profit from their activity. Eventually,
this change could actually help them compete with piracy effectively, by
providing users with a legal downloading service. In the end, all of the
above-mentioned factors could also help labels remove the negative
image that certain individuals associate with the major recording
companies.118
D. Legal System
One of the primary challenges for the copyright regime currently in
force is balancing the two original functions of copyright, namely
“rewarding creativity and … disseminating knowledge.”119 By offering a
way to reconcile commercial exploitation of a work with noncommercial dissemination, the CC-Plus protocol appears to be a
significant step forward in that direction.
From a legal perspective the CC-Plus scheme also addresses some of
the strongest critiques of the Creative Commons project. For example,
Niva Elkin-Koren has argued that this new licensing system is “reducing
the cost of licensing,”120 and thus is providing individual authors “with
an efficient mechanism to execute their intellectual property rights.”121 In
her opinion, this will encourage individual authors using Creative
Commons licenses to “set limits on the exploitation of their works.”122 In
addition, she claims that such a new licensing system might be
unnecessary since, before its inception, “many works were posted online
without any restrictions, on the implicit presumption that re-use is
116
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permissible for non-commercial purposes.”123 Creative Commons
licenses and the CC-Plus scheme, however, are intended to lower
transaction costs for users of creative works—not for creators of the
works124—by providing individual authors with an inexpensive tool to
facilitate free use of their works. If an author wishes to make a profit out
of his or her work, the most economical way to do so is still to rely on
the traditional copyright, which automatically accrues on creative works
and which does not require authors to invest time and money in trying to
modify the contractual terms of its copyright with a Creative Commons
license. The CC-Plus scheme also empowers authors who are not seeking
immediate economic returns from their works to transform what was
before just an implicit presumption into an explicit statement. This
change may be very valuable in trying to reinforce the principle of legal
certainty and, consequently, in simplifying the process of re-using
creative works.
A second critique of the Creative Commons system raised by ElkinKoren concerns the “lack of standardization,”125 that results from the six
different available licensing schemes available. She claims that such a
lack of standardization increases “the cost of determining the duties and
privileges related to any specific work.”126 Her concern is that by
providing authors with six different licensing options, the Creative
Commons system is likely to lead to “information costs”127 for third
parties interested in creating derivative works without violating
intellectual property law. This critique captures one of Creative
Commons’ main weaknesses and the CC-Plus protocol does not
specifically identify a solution. Yet, looking at the practical applications
of the protocol that have been analyzed above, it seems that in practice
business models complying with the CC-Plus protocol tend to
circumvent the problem by adopting a single standard license.
Magnatune and Beatpick, for example, do not give their users the ability
to choose which Creative Commons license to use. Instead, all tracks
hosted by these two music platforms have a standard Attribution NonCommercial Share Alike license.
A final critique that has been raised against the Creative Commons
licenses is that such licenses are of no use to individuals who enter an
exclusive agreement with an intermediary and then decide to permit
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certain free uses of their works, for example because their works are not
being disseminated by the intermediary for reasons of profitability. Once
an exclusive transfer of rights has taken place, it is not possible for an
author to sign other agreements with third parties, even if the subsequent
agreements involve non-commercial use of the work.128 While the CCPlus protocol does not represent an ultimate solution to this problem, it
does provide artists who anticipate such a risk for their own works with
an instrument to exploit their works commercially and, at the same time,
permit non-commercial use of their creations.
A final point that should be emphasized is that the legal downloading
services that have been developed with under the CC-Plus model may
contribute to solving the problem of piracy. In a research study published
in 2006, Carlos Ruiz De La Torre suggested that in order to attract
consumers, a model legal downloading service should have the following
seven features: (1) “offer a larger catalogue of downloadable music”; (2)
“allow for compatibility of devices used by consumers for downloading,
playback and storage”; (3) “offer individuals songs in addition to
albums”; (4) “set affordable prices for downloads”; (5) “allow for
reasonable personal uses of downloads by consumers, including the
ability to make limited copies of recordings”; (6) “offer incentives, like
sponsored downloads and prizes”; and (7) “provide security from
computer viruses.” 129
The three platforms analyzed above incorporate all of these features.
Hence it is reasonable to expect that these websites might be able to
compete with illegal downloading systems in the future. Should these
new hybrid intermediaries become successful in attracting users, the
volume of illegal sharing might significantly decrease. This should better
enable authorities to enforce copyright law. At present, millions of users
systematically infringe the law, despite being aware of their violation.130
While it is harder to enforce the law with millions of infringing users,
should the volume of piracy decrease significantly the risk of being sued
for breach of copyright would probably increase. This might result in
users being more respectful of the law. If so, the Internet community
would probably start regarding the intellectual property regime as a set of
rules that are effective in practice and not only in theory.
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E. Collection Societies
Collection agencies were created in the nineteenth century by
composers and publishers to help individual copyright holders enforce
their statutory claims to exclusive use and remuneration. These
organizations are primarily engaged in monitoring musical activity in a
specific territory, so as to be able to handle collection and distribution of
royalties accordingly.131 Collective management of copyright enables
rights holders to benefit from economies of scale and scope, especially in
the process of enforcing licenses. These scale and scope economies are
positively associated with standardization of usage policies. Thus, if
copyright owners could offer customized licenses to different users,
collective management of rights would probably become more
complicated and, consequently, more costly.132 Due to the fact that the
Creative Commons licensing system is designed to empower authors to
diversify contractual terms, several different collection agencies have
been encountering problems while updating their structure in response to
the rise of the Creative Commons licensing system.
The SIAE is still in the process of developing a scheme that would
enable member artists to license their works with Creative Commons.133
At present, SIAE members have the ability to permit certain free uses of
their works and still rely on SIAE for the collection and consequent
distribution of their royalties. However, the provisions contained in
Article 11 of the SIAE General Regulations limit these possibilities.134
According to Article 11, artists may only relinquish their rights of
reproduction and communication to the public. These exceptions,
however, only apply to uses through data telecommunications networks.
Therefore, SIAE’s statutory exceptions seem to differ in scope from the
contents of Creative Commons licenses.135 As a result, an artist willing to
131
See Roger Wallis et al., Contested Collective Administration of Intellectual Property Rights
in Music: The Challenge to the Principles of Reciprocity and Solidarity, 14 EUR. J. COMM. 5, 5.
(1999).
132
See Eric Brousseau & Christian Bessy, Public and Private Institutions in the Governance of
Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INNOVATION, GOVERNANCE AND
THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 243, 255 (Birgitte Andersen ed., Edward Elgar Publishing
2006).
133
In particular, artists that have granted SIAE an ad hoc mandate for the collection of
revenues from commercial uses would be affected most by the introduction of such a scheme.
134
See Regolamento Generale della Società Italiana degli Autori ed Editori, approvato
dall’Assemblea nella riunione del 13 giugno 2007 [General Regulation of the SIAE, as Approved by
the
Assembly
on
June
13,
2007],
SIAE
http://www.siae.it/documents/BG_Normativa_Regolamentogenerale13-6-07.pdf?41134 (It.).
135
In particular, these statutory exceptions do not seem to address all rights which must be
cleared for online distribution of digital contents. With reference to online file sharing, see Creatività
Remunerata, Conoscenza Liberata: File Sharing e Licenze Collettive Estese [Remunerated
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license his or her works under a Creative Commons may choose to do so,
provided that he or she is willing to manage copyright directly.
A second possibility may exist; some of the new business ventures
analyzed encourage their artists to join foreign collection societies, such
as ASCAP or BMI, instead of joining SIAE.136 If an artist decides to join
a foreign collection society, SIAE should assist the foreign agency in
collecting royalties over the Italian territory. However, this option is
conditioned on two requirements. First, members of the foreign
collection society must have the option to permit free uses of their
works.137 Second, the foreign collection society must have signed a
reciprocal representation agreement with SIAE that does not preclude
this practice.
Whether these conditions are satisfied depends on the specific
collection agency and on the specific reciprocal agreement under
consideration. For the purpose of this Article, it suffices that the actual
viability of this second option is still a source of great debate.
Consequently, artists willing to follow the CC-Plus protocol to license
their works are currently entitled to do so, except for the specific
situations mentioned above, provided that they opt out of SIAE.138 This
situation puts musicians in a very burdensome position as it forces them
to carry out all monitoring activities required to enforce their copyright.
The status quo does not seem favorable for the Creative Commons
licenses. Even for the CC-Plus protocol there is still much improvement
expected. For example, the Creative Commons Italia working group is
engaged in negotiations with SIAE to work out a mandate enabling
artists to use the Creative Commons licenses, or at least some of these

Creativity, Freed Knowledge: File Sharing and Extended Collective Licenses], NEXA (Nov. 12,
2008), http://nexa.polito.it/sites/nexa.polito.it/files/NEXA-filesharing-marzo2009.pdf (It.). For an
exhaustive description of the economic rights which must be secured, see Articles 12 through 19 of
the
Italian
Law
no.
633
of
April
22,
1941,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/it/it112en.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
136
See, e.g., David d’Atri, Perchè Aspettare la SIAE?? Go ASCAP! [Why Wait for SIAE?? Go
ASCAP!] (Feb. 5, 2008, 3:26 PM), http://lists.ibiblio.org/pipermail/cc-it/2008-February/003991.html
(It.).
137
For instance, in 2008 ASCAP officially recognized the artists’ right to decide when and
where their “creative works may be used for free.” AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS &
PUBLISHERS, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SONGWRITERS AND COMPOSERS, available at
http://www.ascap.com/rights/pdf/BillOfRights.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
138
See Gaia Bottà, SIAE e Creative Commons si Cercano, si Troveranno? [SIAE and Creative
Commons Are Looking for Each Other, Will They Manage to Find Each Other?],
PUNTOINFORMATICO (Dec. 2, 2008), http://punto-informatico.it/2493116/PI/News/siae-creativecommons-si-cercano-si-troveranno.aspx (It.).
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licenses, and simultaneously take advantage of the intermediation of
SIAE to collect revenues from commercial uses of their works.139
Not all countries are encountering these same problems. In many
jurisdictions artists affiliated with the local collection society already
have the option to use Creative Commons licenses.140 For example, the
Dutch collection agency Buma/Stemra and the Danish Koda have
already started to offer their affiliated artists the option of using Creative
Commons licenses as an alternative to traditional copyright.141 Also, in
May 2009, the Swedish collecting society Stim launched a two-year
project aimed at testing the possibility of liberalizing the use of Creative
Commons licenses. Consequently, Swedish artists are now allowed to
license their works with Creative Commons and rely on Stim for the
collection of their royalties.142
F. Society as a Whole
By adopting customary licensing schemes based on traditional all
rights reserved copyright, artists may have problems trying to reconcile
their commercial interest in creating a work with their goal of getting
their works distributed as widely as possible.143 The CC-Plus protocol
should help artists overcome this problem, providing them with a useful
tool to give their works as much exposure as possible, thanks to the
Creative Commons licenses employed, and simultaneously ensure an
economic reward for their work, typically thanks to the role of some new
intermediaries.
This should have a two-fold effect on the volume of works available
to the public for use and re-use. On the one hand, by granting a financial
reward to artists, the CC-Plus protocol will continue to foster creation of
139
See Federico Morando, Faccia a Faccia tra CC e SIAE – La Stampa e La Repubblica [CC
and SIAE Meet – La Stampa and La Repubblica], CREATIVE COMMONS (Dec. 1, 2008, 4:30 PM),
http://www.creativecommons.it/node/693 (citing articles from both La Stampa and La Repubblica)
(It.).
140
See
Collecting
Society
Projects,
CREATIVE
COMMONS
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Collecting_Society_Projects (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
141
See Riccardo Bagnato, Creative Commons e SIAE: Copyright al Tempo del Web [Creative
Commons and SIAE: Copyright in the era of Internet], LA REPUBBLICA, (Nov. 27, 2008),
http://www.repubblica.it/2008/11/sezioni/scienza_e_tecnologia/copyright/copyright/copyright.html
(It.); KODA’s medlemmer får mulighed for at bruge Creative Commons [KODA’s members are
allowed
to
use
Creative
Commons],
KODA
(Jan.
24,
2008),
http://www.koda.dk/nyhedsbrev/nyhedsbreve-og-pm/presse/kodas-medlemmer-faar-mulighed-forat-bruge-creative-commons/ (Den.).
142
See Collecting Society Projects, supra note 140; Swedish Performing Rights Society, Stim
först i Sverige med Creative Commons-licens [STIM is the first to adopt Creative Commons in
Sweden], STIM (May 29, 2009), http://www.stim.se/sv/PRESS/Pressmeddelanden/Stim-forst-iSverige-med-Creative-Commons-licens/ (Swed.).
143
See Montagnani & Borghi, supra note 19, at 251.

129

SPRING 2011

Creative Commons

new art. Therefore, on the market’s input side, no significant changes
should take place.144 On the other hand, the more flexible legal
framework in which these new music platforms operate should enable
easier access to works hosted by them.
Implementation of the CC-Plus protocol might actually turn out to be
good for the economy because sharing, sampling, and remixing activities
have great economic potential through firms producing software and
technologies that support these kinds of activities.145 Because of the
wider opportunities for re-use available to the public, a new market for
innovative products that facilitate sharing activities—for example,
through physical supports or software infrastructure—may open up.
Finally, the introduction of new intermediaries in the market might
help break down the oligopoly currently controlling the music industry.
With the development of digital music formats, economies of scale in the
music industry have gradually vanished.146 Consequently, one of the last
rationales for an oligopoly has been weakened.147 Therefore, society
might benefit from an increase in competition. The deadweight loss for
society resulting from just five labels controlling the market could be
mitigated thanks to this change.
VI. CURRENT ISSUES: PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THESE NEW
BUSINESS MODELS
To become established players in the digital music market, business
ventures endorsing the CC-Plus protocol still have to overcome a few
difficulties.
First, as described above, the music platforms examined might not
always have the power to assist artists in the process of enforcing their
licenses.148 This might discourage musicians from contributing to these
new projects. Second, artists willing to withdraw from collecting
societies, like SIAE, might need assistance from these new music
144
One might argue that financial reward for artists would not be as strong as it is under the
traditional copyright system. Yet, ways in which artists could still keep profiting (or even increase
their profits) with the CC-Plus protocol have already been exposed. See supra, Part V.A.
145
See LESSIG, supra note 99, at 88 (discussing the great economic potential of consumer
created content because of the large amount of technology that it is necessary to purchase in order to
create such content).
146
See Peitz & Waelbroeck, supra note 89, at 426.
147
An oligopoly is defined as “an industry with only a small number of producers.” See PAUL
KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS 388 (Worth Publishers ed. 2009). To understand
why scale economies justify a small number of firms operating in a market, see Rabah Amir, Market
Structure, Scale Economies and Industry Performance 3 (CORE Discussion Papers, Paper No. 65,
2003), available at http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/services/psfiles/dp03/dp2003-65.pdf.
148
See supra Part V.E.
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platforms to re-negotiate their previous contracts.149 Third, music
licensees, in practice, might still encounter difficulties in proving to the
authorities that they have rights to the tracks they are using. In Italy, for
example, SIAE regularly carries out inspections all over the Italian
territory. Jamendo, Beatpick, and Magnatune have each encountered
difficulties in avoiding fines when dealing with local representatives of
SIAE.150
These issues represent a significant obstacle to a widespread
adoption of the CC-Plus scheme. To overcome these problems,
intermediaries endorsing the new protocol have to face all of the costs
associated with the protection of their customers—for example,
provision of appropriate legal assistance—and the costs of the
negotiations that have to be conducted with collection societies and other
authorities.151
As with many innovative projects, one of the main hurdles for these
new business models is that of gaining enough visibility to attract more
artists and users to their websites. Despite evidence of prominent growth
rates for these new websites, Creative Commons licenses are still
unknown to many artists and users.152 The CC-Plus protocol, as well as
the cost-saving opportunities offered by it, is just starting to be explored
by players in the music industry. In regards to this issue, Magnatune’s
initiative of advertising its website through tracks made available for free
downloading appears to be a suitable strategy to gain further exposure.

149
See Gaia Bottà, Musica d’Ambiente, Nuovi Intermediari [Ambient Music, New
Intermediaries],
PUNTOINFORMATICO
(June
5,
2009),
http://puntoinformatico.it/2637979/PI/News/musica-ambiente-nuovi-intermediari.aspx [hereinafter Ambient
Music] (It.).
150
Id. An example of a source of controversy is the SIAE sticker that physical carriers used for
the distribution of musical contents have to display, no matter what the licensing terms are. See
Creative Commons, uso commerciale e SIAE [Creative Commons, Commercial Use and SIAE],
SELILI, http://selili.polito.it/node/100 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) (It.).
151
See Ambient Music, supra note 149.
152
See Andrew Murray, Powerpoint Presentation delivered at the London School of Economics
and Political Science: Digital Content 32 (July 30, 2009) (on file with author).
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FEATURE

BEATPICK

JAMENDO

MAGNATUNE

DRM protections

No

No

No

Re-download option

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Free noncommercial use

Controlled and, in
certain situations,
not available
• 90% (at least) of
• 50% of the
earnings made by

Artists’ revenue

a track;
• 100% of backend
royalties.

the donations;
• 50% of the
website’s
advertising
revenue;
• a share of backend
royalties.

Commenting system

No
Standard license:
Creative Commons

Licenses

‘Attribution NonCommercial Share
Alike’

Exclusivity of the
agreement

Yes, very developed
Choice among one
of the six Creative
Commons licenses
or a Free Art license

No

No

Anytime

Anytime

Possibility of
termination of the
agreement

• 50% of the sale
price of each
album;
• 50% of any
commercial sublicensing;
• 50% of
merchandise
profits.
Yes, but limited
Standard license:
Creative Commons
‘Attribution NonCommercial Share
Alike’
No
5-year commitment
required
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